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Labor and Employment
by Patrick L. Coyle*
Alexandra Garrison Barnett"
and Brooks A. Suttle***
Courts within the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit handed down a number of important labor and employment
opinions during the January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2012 survey
period.' The following is a discussion of those opinions.
I.

FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT

Addressing an issue of first impression among all United States
Courts of Appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held in Pereda v. Brookdale
Senior Living Communities, Inc.2 that the Family and Medical Leave
Act (FMLA or the Act)8 protects an employee's advance request for
future FMLA leave, or notice of intent to take such future leave, even if
that employee is ineligible for FMLA leave at the time of the request or
notification.4 The decision makes clear that, at least in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, such a pre-eligibility
notification or request for future leave is protected activity under the

* Senior Associate in the firm of Alston & Bird LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Notre Dame (B.A., magna cum laude, 1999); University of Virginia School of Law (J.D.,
2004). Member, State Bars of Georgia and South Carolina.
** Associate in the firm of Alston & Bird LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Dartmouth College
(A.B., magna cum laude, 2007); University of Virginia School of Law (J.D., 2010). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of Alston & Bird LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Pennsylvania (BA, 2002); Emory University Law School (J.D., 2012). Member, State Bar
of Georgia.

1. For an analysis of labor and employment law during the prior survey period, see
Patrick L. Coyle & Alexandra V. Garrison, Labor and Employment, Eleventh Circuit
Survey, 63 MERCER L. REV. 1309 (2012).

2.

666 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012).

3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
4. Pereda, 666 F.3d at 1274.
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FMLA on which a FMLA retaliation or interference claim may be
based.5
In October 2008, Kathryn Pereda (Pereda) began working at an
assisted living facility operated by Brookdale Senior Living Communities, Inc. (Brookdale). Eight months later, in June 2009, she informed
Brookdale that she was pregnant and would be requesting FMLA leave
after the birth of her child, which was due five months later (in
November).6 To be eligible for protected leave under the FMLA,
employees are required to have been employed for at least twelve
months and worked at least 1,250 hours within the twelve months prior
to the start of their leave.' As such, Pereda was ineligible for FMLA
protected leave when she informed Brookdale of her pregnancy, but she
would have become eligible prior to the commencement of the anticipated leave if she had remained employed with Brookdale at the time she
delivered her child. In September 2009, however, before Pereda attained
eligibility under the Act and before her child was born, Brookdale
terminated her employment.'
Following the termination of her employment, Pereda commenced an
action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida. In her complaint, Pereda alleged that she was a "top employee"
at Brookdale when she gave notice of her pregnancy, but after providing
notice, Brookdale subjected her to a period of harassment, intense job
scrutiny, and unfair treatment that caused a number of pregnancyrelated medical issues.9 Pereda further alleged that in addition to being
placed "on a performance improvement plan with unattainable goals,"
she was punished for taking leave to attend prenatal doctor appointments.' ° Although Brookdale informed her that she was eligible for
non-FMLA leave, she alleged that her employment was terminated when
she took time off for bed rest, as instructed by her physician. Based on
these factual allegations, Pereda asserted that Brookdale retaliated
against her for exercising her rights under the FMLA and interfered
with her FMLA rights.'

5. Id. at 1276.
6. Id. at 1271.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2). In addition to being eligible, at the time of the leave, an
employee must have experienced a triggering event, such as the birth of a child, to be
protected under the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1).
8. Pereda, 666 F.3d at 1271.

9. Id.

10. Id.
11. Id.
Under section 2615(a) of the FMLA, an employee may bring two types of claims:
interference claims, in which an employee asserts that his employer denied or
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In responding to Pereda's complaint, Brookdale filed a 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 12 The district court granted the
motion, dismissing the interference claim on the grounds that Brookdale
"could not have interfered with Pereda's FMLA rights, because she was
not entitled to FMLA leave at the time that she requested it."" The
district court dismissed Pereda's retaliation claim on similar grounds,
holding that she could not have engaged in a statutorily protected
activity because she was not an eligible employee under the FMLA;
therefore, Brookdale could not have retaliated against her for an activity
protected by the Act.' 4 In support of its conclusions, the district court
cited a number of other district court opinions from within the circuit. 5
Noting the "dearth of opinions from circuit courts" on the issue of
whether a pre-eligibility request for leave or notification of intent to take
leave commencing after the employee would be eligible under the FMLA
can serve as the basis for a retaliation or interference claim, the
Eleventh Circuit looked to district court opinions from several other
circuits for guidance.16 The court observed that the opinions relied
upon by the district court in granting Brookdale's motion to dismiss were
inapposite because they did not involve employees who would have been
eligible for leave at the time their leave was to commence. 7 Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court's holding ran counter
to the purpose of the FMLA." Specifically, the court stated as follows:
allowing the district court's ruling to stand would violate the purposes
for which the FMLA was enacted. Without protecting against preeligibility interference, a loophole is created whereby an employer has
total freedom to terminate an employee before she can ever become

otherwise interfered with his substantive rights under the Act; and retaliation
claims, in which an employee asserts that his employer discriminated against him
because he engaged in an activity protected by the Act.
Id. at 1272.
12. Id. at 1271.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1273 n.6 ("See Hills v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 08-23197-CIV, 2010 WL
1839268, at *7-8 (S.D. Fla. May 6, 2010) (dismissing retaliation claim when plaintiff was
not an eligible employee at the time of the request or when leave commenced)); Pennant
v. Convergys Corp., 368 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (calculating eligibility as
of the day leave commenced per 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d)); Morehardt v. Spirit Airlines, Inc.,
174 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (dismissing retaliation claim when employee had not
worked the required number of hours by the day of her request, which was also the day
FMLA leave was to commence)").
16. Id. at 1273 n.7.
17. Id. at 1273 n.6.
18. Id. at 1273.
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Such a situation is contrary to the basic concept of the

FMLA. 19

Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision
to grant Brookdale's motion to dismiss, holding that Pereda had stated
sufficient facts to establish 20prima facie claims for interference and
retaliation under the FMLA.
Regarding Pereda's interference claim, the court observed that
"because the FMLA requires [thirty days'] notice in advance of [foreseeable] future leave, employees are protected from interference prior to the
occurrence of a triggering event."2 1 Quoting a district court opinion
from the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, the court concluded that it would be "illogical" for the FMLA to
include a notice requirement that protects employers from unanticipated
employee absences while at the same time exposing those same
employees "to retaliation, or interference, for which they have no
remedy."22 Citing an opinion from the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the court stated further that such
an interpretation would create "a trap for newer employees and extend 0
to employers a significant exemption from liability."23 To fulfill the
basic purposes of the FMLA, the court concluded that "logic mandates"
the "FMLA be read to allow a cause of action for employees who, like
Pereda," actually exceed the FMLA's required thirty days' notice for a
foreseeable future leave. 24
In reaching this conclusion on the interference claim, the court
rejected multiple arguments advanced by Brookdale. 25 First, Brookdale
argued that under 29 C.F.R. § 825.112,26 an employee only becomes
eligible for FMLA leave upon the occurrence of the FMLA triggering
event, which in the pregnancy context is the birth of the child. Based
on that federal regulation, Brookdale asserted that it could not be liable
for terminating Pereda on either a retaliation or interference claim as a
matter of law because it terminated her employment before she ever

19. Id.
20. Id. at 1276-77.
21. Id. at 1274. The FMIA mandates that where the need for leave is foreseeable,
employees must give their employer notice that they will be taking such leave at least
thirty days before it is to commence. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(1).
22. Pereda,666 F.3d at 1274 (quoting Reynolds v. Inter-Indus. Conf. on Auto Collision
Repair, 594 F. Supp. 2d 925, 928 (N.D. IlM.2009)).
23. Id. (citing Beffert v. Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, No. Civ. A. 05-43, 2005 WL 906362,
at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 2005)).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1274-77.
26. 29 C.F.R. § 825.112 (2012).
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became eligible for FMLA protection. The court, however, distinguished
between (i) being eligible to actually take leave and (ii) being protected
after requesting leave that would begin in the future, after eligibility
and after the triggering event.2 ' Accordingly, the court held that the
requirement for eligibility "does not open the door for pre-eligible
interference with FMLA rights with impunity.""
Rather, because
eligibility is determined "as of the date the FMLA leave is to start," and
the Act requires employees to give notice prior to that date, the Act
plainly contemplates a situation where notice would be given in advance
of actual eligibility.29 In short, the Eleventh Circuit rejected Brookdale's argument, observing that adopting it would "frustrate the purpose
of the FMLA by permitting employers to eliminate staff that the
employer perceives will need FMLA" leave.3 °
Second, Brookdale argued that overturning the district court's ruling
would "improperly expand the reach of the FMLA to cover ineligible
employees."31 The court also rejected this argument, explaining that
the court's holding did not expand the scope of employees protected by
the FMLA.32 Rather, the court "simply h[eld] that a pre-eligible
employee has a cause of action if an employer terminates her in order to
avoid having to accommodate that employee with rightful FMLA leave
rights once that employee becomes eligible."33
Following similar reasoning in relation to the retaliation claim,' the
Eleventh Circuit rejected the district court's finding that because Pereda
was not eligible for FMLA benefits, "she therefore could not have
engaged in statutorily protected activity, even if she would have become
eligible at some point in the future."' Again emphasizing the policy
underlying the FMLA, the court held that Pereda's notification of her
intent to take FMLA leave was indeed a protected activity.3 The court
explained:

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Pereda, 666 F.3d at 1274-75.
Id. at 1274.
Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d) (2012).
Pereda, 666 F.3d at 1275.
Id. at 1272 n.4.
Id. at 1275.

33. Id.
34. "[To state a prima facie case [for FMLA retaliation, the plaintiffl must show that:
'(1) she engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment
decision; and (3) the decision was causally related to a protected activity.'" Id. (quoting
Walker v. Elmore Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 379 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2004)).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1277.

970

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

We hold that a pre-eligible request for post-eligible leave is protected
activity because the FMLA aims to support both employees in the
process of exercising their FMIA rights and employers in planning for
the absence of employees on FMLA leave. Protecting both reflects that
the FMLA should be executed in a manner that accommodates the
legitimate interests of employers without abusing the interests of
employees.37
In so ruling, the court held that Pereda must be permitted to proceed on
her claim for retaliation and that dismissal was inappropriate, remanding the case for further proceedings to the district court.3"
Finally, the court summarily dismissed Brookdale's argument that
under the court's reasoning "an employee could be deemed FMLA eligible
from the first week of employment."39 As noted above, the court made
clear that it was not expanding eligibility for the FMLA through the
holding, but rather ensuring appropriate protections for those employees
who notify their employers of their intent to take FMLA leave once
eligible to do so.4 ° The court highlighted, however, that such employees
"still could be terminated for legitimate reasons, such as poor performance or dishonesty," or could otherwise fail to become eligible under
the requirements of the Act. 4
Overall, Pereda was significant not only as a case of first impression
for both the Eleventh Circuit and the Courts of Appeal as a whole, but
for the breadth of the holding and the potential implications the case
will have for employers moving forward in relation to advance leave
requests by ineligible employees. Given the Peredaholding, an employer
who has been notified of an employee's intent to take FMLA leave in the
future should proceed with caution in advance of any adverse employment action in relation to that employee, even if the employee is not yet
eligible for FMLA protection at the time of the notification. Similarly,
employees should take some comfort in knowing that even if they are
ineligible for FMLA leave at the time they make their requests, Pereda
supports potential FMLA liability against employers that retaliate or
interfere with employees' right to take FMLA leave upon becoming
eligible.
A question that may arise following Pereda, however, is just how
definite the advanced leave request or notice of intent to take future

37. Id. at 1276 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 1273.
Id. at 1276.
Id.
Id.
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leave must be in order to qualify as activity protected by the FMLA. By
its terms, Peredais not limited to cases involving pregnancy. While an
employee such as Pereda can anticipate the need for leave and, to some
degree of certainty, when the leave will occur, other FMLA-triggering
events outside the pregnancy context may be less predictable. Could an
employee on his first day of employment notify his employer that he will
need to take FMLA leave in one year due to a health condition and be
protected from FMLA interference or retaliation under Pereda? Would
such a notification be protected if the employee alerted the employer of
a condition that may require him to take FMLA leave at a particular
time, or will require him to take FMLA leave at a time that is harder to
predict? Perhaps these and other questions will be addressed in future
cases.
II.

LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT

In Mulhall v. UNITE HERE Local 355,42 the Eleventh Circuit
considered whether intangible organizing assistance offered by an
employer to a labor union can be a "thing of value" that violates section
302 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).4 s Deciding the
issue for the first time, the court held in a 2-1 decision that such
assistance could be a thing of value in violation of § 302 "if demanded or
given as payment."44 In so ruling, however, the court split from its
sister courts in the United States Courts of Appeal for the Third and
Fourth Circuits, providing an avenue for nonunion employees to
challenge neutrality agreements entered into by their employers.
In August 2004, Hollywood Greyhound Track, Inc., d/b/a Mardi Gras
Gaming (Mardi Gras) entered into a memorandum of agreement (MOA)
with UNITE HERE Local 355 (Unite) in which Mardi Gras promised to
give union representatives access to its private work premises during
non-work hours for organizing purposes, to provide the union with
certain employee data, and to remain neutral toward the unionization
of its employees.45 In exchange, Unite promised to give financial
support to a ballot initiative on casino gaming that would benefit Mardi
Gras, support ultimately valued at more than $100,000.46 Unite
further promised to refrain from picketing, boycotting, striking, or other

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

667 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1213; see also 29 U.S.C. § 186 (2006).
Mulhall, 667 F.3d at 1213.
Id.
Id.
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adverse economic activity against Mardi Gras if Unite was recognized as
the exclusive bargaining agent for the company's employees.4 7
Martin Mulhall (Mulhall) was a Mardi Gras employee who was
opposed to unionization of the Mardi Gras workforce. In his initial
complaint, Mulhall sought to enjoin enforcement of the MOA under § 302
of the LMRA, which prohibits employers from paying, lending, or
delivering any money or thing of value to any labor organization that
attempts to represent any of the employer's employees that are employed
in an industry that affects commerce.48 Although the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially held that
Mulhall lacked standing to bring the case, that decision was reversed on
appeal by the Eleventh Circuit in 2010.4" On remand, the district court
again dismissed Mulhall's complaint (this time for failure to state a
claim) holding that the assistance promised in the MOA could not
constitute a "thing of value" under § 302.50
As this was an issue of first impression for the Eleventh Circuit, the
court relied upon other Courts of Appeal in making its decision. For
example, the court quoted with approval the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's explanation that the "dominant purpose
of § 302 is to prevent employers from tampering with the loyalty of
union officials and to prevent union officials from extorting tribute from
employers."5 ' The court also took note of its own interpretations of the
phrase "thing of value" outside of the § 302 context.52 In United States
v. Nilsen,5 the Eleventh Circuit noted that the phrase was a "term of
art which the courts generally construe to envelop[U both tangibles and
intangibles."54 In that case, the court held that the expected testimony

47. Id.
48. Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(2).
49. Mulhall v. UNITE HERE Local 355, 618 F.3d 1279, 1294 (11th Cir. 2010). This
case was discussed in our previous article summarizing the significant Eleventh Circuit
decisions of 2010. See Patrick L. Coyle & Alexandra V. Garrison, Labor and Employment,
Eleventh Circuit Survey, 62 MERCER L. REV. 1199, 1206-11 (2011). In that article, we
noted that "[ilt remains to be seen if, when presented with a substantive challenge, the
Eleventh Circuit will join its sister circuits and determine that agreements between an
employer and a union... do not constitute an impermissible 'thing of value' under the
LMRA" Id. at 1211. Here, the court addressed this substantive issue and answered the
question left open by its prior decision. Mulhall, 667 F.3d at 1213.
50. Mulhall, 667 F.3d at 1213.
51. Id. at 1214 (quoting Turner v. Local Union No. 302, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 604
F.2d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 1979)).
52. Id.
53. 967 F.2d 539 (11th Cir. 1992).
54. Id. at 542 (involving a criminal statute prohibiting letters written with the intent
to extort a thing of value).
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of a key government witness was a thing of value, noting that "monetary
worth is not the sole measure of value." 5'
Prior to the Eleventh Circuit's decision, the Third and Fourth Circuits
addressed the precise factual scenario facing the court, and both of those
decisions held that a neutrality agreement was not a thing of value
under § 302. In Hotel Employees & RestaurantEmployees Union, Local
57 v. Sage Hospitality Resource, LLC,5" the Third Circuit determined
that, regardless of who benefitted from such an agreement, organizing
assistance did not qualify as a payment, loan, or delivery, and therefore
could not be the source of a § 302 violation.5" Similarly, the Fourth
Circuit held in Adcock v. FreightlinerLLC58 that organizing assistance
could not be the basis for a § 302 claim because its value could not be
ascertained.59
Although the Eleventh Circuit rejected the conclusions of its sister
courts in the Third and Fourth Circuits, it did find some support in
decisions from the Sixth and Second Circuits that were factually distinct
but still involved a "thing of value" in the § 302 context.6 ° In one case,
United States v. Douglas,6 ' the Sixth Circuit concluded that a "thing of
value" under § 302 was not limited to things of monetary value in
holding that jobs given by an employer to non-qualified relatives of
union officials constituted a violation of the statute.6 2 Speaking more
broadly, the Second Circuit held in United States v.Roth6 3 that "[vialue
is usually set by the desire to have the 'thing' and depends upon the
individual and the circumstances."6 4 Accordingly, the Second Circuit
"recommended that common sense should inform determinations of
whether an improper benefit has been conferred."6 5
In Mulhall, the Eleventh Circuit found this "common sense" approach
persuasive in drawing the line between proper and improper behavior,
suggesting that the tangible or monetary nature of a "thing of value"
was irrelevant to the purposes of § 302.66 Although the court was
careful to point out that an employer's agreement to remain neutral or

55.

Id. at 543.

56.

390 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 2004).

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 219.
550 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 374.
Mulhall, 667 F.3d at 1214-15.
634 F.3d 852 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3039 (2011).
Id. at 858.
333 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1964).
Id. at 453 (holding that a loan is a thing of value under § 302).
Mulhall, 667 F.3d at 1215.
Id.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

974

[Vol. 64

otherwise assist in an organizing campaign is not a violation of § 302 in
and of itself, the court concluded it "apparent" that such an agreement
was a thing of value and could operate as an improper payment.6 7
Therefore, the court decided that it was "too broad to hold that all
neutrality and cooperation agreements are exempt from the prohibitions
in § 302," 6' stating as follows:
Whether something qualifies as a payment depends not on whether it
is tangible or has monetary value, but on whether its performance
fulfills an obligation. If employers offer organizing assistance with the
intention of improperly influencing a union, then the policy concerns
in § 302-curbing bribery and extortion-are implicated.69
Thus, in contrast to the Third and Fourth Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit
directed courts to look not to the "thing" itself (namely, the assistance
provided by the employer to the union), but to the intent of the parties
involved to determine whether a promise was made "as valuable
consideration in a scheme to corrupt a union or to extort a benefit from
an employer."" Finding that issue to be an open question, the court
remanded the case back to the district court to "determine the reason
71
why Unite and Mardi Gras agreed to cooperate with one another."
In a dissent, Judge Jane Restani wrote in support of the Third and
Fourth Circuits' reasoning, explaining that the majority's focus on the
parties' intent was a "non-starter" that conflicted with the purpose of the
LMRA.72 Specifically, she stated that the LMRA is "designed to
promote both labor peace and collective bargaining," and it cannot fulfill
that purpose "and, at the same time, penalize unions that are attempting to achieve greater collective bargaining rights" by demanding the
types of concessions found here. 73 This would hold true, the dissent
proposed, even if the union had some ulterior motive in demanding the
concessions, such as merely growing its membership and dues collection
without actually promoting the employee's interests.74 The dissent
stated that "such conduct implicates the union's duty to its members, not
the collective bargaining process between the employer and the union,"
and is not within the proper scope of a § 302 action.75

67.
68.

Id. at 1215-16.
Id. at 1215.

69. Id.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

75. Id.

at 1216.
(Restani, J., dissenting).
at 1216-17.
at 1217.
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Finally, Judge Restani observed that even under the majority's
holding, there must be some implication of an improper intent for § 302
to apply. 76 Accordingly, the complaint "must contain sufficient factual
allegations showing the union demanded these concessions as extortion
or were offered by the employer as a bribe."77 Here, however, the
complaint made only general allegations that unions can have improper
motives in negotiating for these concessions. 78 'Thus," Judge Restani
concluded, "even under the majority's theory, Mulhall's complaint fails
79
to state a cause of action and should be dismissed."
The Mulhall decision was significant for a number of reasons, not least
of which was that it further substantiated a circuit split on this issue
between the Third and Fourth Circuits on one side-which have both
"addressed challenges to neutrality and cooperation agreements under
§ 302, and.. . found the assistance was not a thing of value"-and the
Sixth, Second, and now Eleventh Circuits on the other.8 0 It remains to
be seen whether the United States Supreme Court will resolve the split
on a certiorari review of this case. In June 2012, the Union appealed the
case to the United States Supreme Court, and both parties have filed
briefs in support of certiorari review." In practical terms, resolution
of this issue may have a significant impact on union-employer interactions.
Arguments have been advanced both in favor of allowing neutrality
agreements such as the one at issue in Mulhall to be negotiated between
unions and employers and against allowing such negotiations. Groups
generally opposed to unionization (such as The National Right to Work
Foundation, representing Mulhall in the case described herein) oppose
neutrality agreements like the one at issue here because they can be
used by unions to gain access to employees' personal information and
avoid secret ballot voting, thereby enabling union representatives to
more effectively pressure employees into joining the union.8"
By
explaining that neutrality agreements may be forbidden in certain
circumstances, the Eleventh Circuit's decision leaves the door open for

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

80. Id. at 1214 (majority opinion).
81. Petition for Certiorari Filed, 81 USLW 3066 (July 20, 2012) (12-99); Cross-Petition
for Certiorari Filed, 81 USLW 3128 (Aug. 22, 2012) (12-312).

82. See Card Check "Thing of Value" dilemma Mulhall v. UNITE HERE (June 1, 2012),
http//www.mrctv.org/embeddedmedia/card-check-thing-value-dilemma-mulhall-v-unite-here
(describing such arrangements as giving "union organizers license to browbeat and
intimidate workers into acceding to unionization").
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employees and other advocates opposed to unionization to rely on the
LMRA as a potentially viable means of thwarting so-called card check
agreements.
Those in favor of allowing neutrality agreements, however, contend
that such agreements can be entirely ethical, efficient, and beneficial for
all involved (if, that is, the agreement is offered as an honest concession
in negotiations that benefits both the employer and employees, and not
as an improper bribe). While the Eleventh Circuit did determine that
neutrality agreements can run afoul of § 302, the court was careful to
point out that these agreements are not a per se violation.' Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit's holding gives courts room in future cases to address
legally or ethically questionable neutrality agreements on a case-by-case
basis.
By focusing the inquiry in relation to neutrality agreements on the
intent of the parties, the Eleventh Circuit in Mulhall avoided a brightline approach in favor of one dependent on circumstances.
The
circumstance-specific nature of the Mulhall holding may deter unions
and employers in the Eleventh Circuit from entering neutrality
agreements in the future and lead to additional challenges of agreements
already in place. That ambiguity may be short lived, however; as noted
above, the Supreme Court may take up the issue. In early January
2013, the Court invited the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing
the view of the United States Government, suggesting that it may grant
certiorari review and settle the split between the circuits.' Until then,
both unions and employers in the Eleventh Circuit interested in
negotiating a neutrality agreement will have to bear the risk that it
could be challenged under the LMRA.
III. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
In Lakeland Health Care Associates, LLC v. NLRB,' the Eleventh
Circuit vacated a decision by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB
or the Board), which ruled that licensed practical nurses (LPNs) at a
long-term care facility are not "supervisors" within the meaning of the

83. Mulhall, 667 F.3d at 1215.
84. The exact issue on appeal will be "Whether intangible things can be 'deliver[ed]'
under Section 302(a)(2) of the Labor Management Relations Act, which makes it unlawful
for employers 'to pay, lend, or deliver, or agree to pay, lend, or deliver, any money or other
thing of value ... to any labor organization.' 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(2)." See ScOTus BLOG,
httpJ/www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/mulhall-v-unite-here-local-355/ (last visited Feb.
20, 2013) (alteration in original).
85. 696 F.3d 1332 (l1th Cir. 2012).
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National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). In spite of the court's deferential standard of review on appeal, the three-judge panel held 2-1 that the
Board's decision was not substantially supported by the record.8"
Indeed, the court did not "merely disagree" with the NLRB's conclusions,
it held that "the Board meticulously excluded or disregarded record
evidence, which, when taken into account, compels a different result."'
Lakeland Health Care Associates, LLC (Lakeland) is an assisted living
facility that employs a variety of full and part-time employees, including
LPNs and certified nursing assistants (CNAs). All of Lakeland's CNAs
are unionized, represented by the United Food and Commercial Workers
Union, Local 1625 (the Union). In August 2010, the Union filed a
petition with the NLRB, seeking also to represent Lakeland's LPNs.
Lakeland opposed the measure, arguing that the LPNs are "supervisors"
within the meaning of the NLRA and are therefore ineligible for union
representation.89
In subsequent hearings, the parties presented testimony from eight
different witnesses and submitted briefs to the NLRB. In September
2010, the NLRB issued a decision in which it found that the LPNs are
not supervisors under the NLRA. The Board subsequently denied
Lakeland's request for review of that decision, and in January 2011,
certified the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative for
Lakeland's LPNs after a representation election.9 0
NLRB orders in representation proceedings are generally not eligible
for judicial review unless the employer refuses to bargain with the union
after certification.9' Accordingly, Lakeland refused to bargain with the
Union after it was certified by the NLRB in January 2011. In response,
the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board, which
resulted in a complaint against Lakeland in February 2011. On April
29, 2011, the Board granted summary judgment in favor of the Union,
finding that Lakeland violated §§ 8(a)(5) and (1) of the NLRA. Lakeland
appealed the Board's decision to the Eleventh Circuit.92
Lakeland conceded that it had refused to bargain with the Union, but
argued that it had not violated the NLRA because its LPNs were
"supervisors" who had no right to unionize under the Act, not "employ-

86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1334.
1350.
1337.
1334; see also 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2006).

90. Lakeland Health CareAssocs., LLC, 696 F.3d at 1334.
91. Id. at 1334 n.2 (citing Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 477-79 (1964)).
92. Id. at 1335.
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ees" who have such a right.93 In analyzing the issue, the court explained that an individual qualifies as a supervisor if: (1) he or she has
the authority to perform one of the twelve supervisory functions
described in the statute; (2) the exercise of that authority requires the
use of independent judgment; and (3) such authority is held in the
interest of the employer.9 4 Only the first two requirements were
disputed, in relation to which Lakeland asserted that the evidence
confirmed the LPNs' authority "to discipline, suspend, and effectively
recommend the termination of the CNAs, and to assign and responsibly
direct the CNAs' work," all of which require the LPNs' use of independent judgment.95
Lakeland's argument centered around the "progressive discipline
system, which it describe[d] as a 'coaching' program," used in its
facilities.9" Under the system, employees who failed to meet expectations
received "either a 'level one' or 'level two' 'coaching,' depending on the
severity of the issue.""' These coachings could be initiated by the
LPNs, with level two coachings leading to an automatic suspension of
the employee and often resulting in termination." Thus, because LPNs
had independent discretionary authority to effectively suspend,
terminate CNAs, or both, Lakeland argued that they were supervisors
under the Act. 9 The Board rejected this argument, however, "reasoning that the record establishes only that the LPNs are responsible for
10 0
reporting employee misconduct."
In reviewing the Board's conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit observed
that "the Board rejected Lakeland's testimonial and documentary
evidence as being in conflict, inconclusive, or conclusory," but that in fact
"[Ut was none of these."10 ' The court then proceeded to cite evidence

93. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). Section 2(11) of the NLRA defines "supervisor" as:
any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other
employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or
effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the
exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires
the use of independent judgment.
29 U.S.C. § 152(11).
94. LakelandHealth CareAssocs., LLC, 696 F.3d at 1336 (citing NLRB v. Health Care
& Ret. Corp., 511 U.S. 571, 573-74 (1994)).

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1337.
Id.
Id.
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from various sources in the record-including job descriptions, employee
handbook language, and testimony from several employees-that
undermined the Board's conclusion that Lakeland's LPNs are employees,
not supervisors, under the NLRA.102 For example, the court highlighted the Board's disregarding (as "isolated" or "sporadic") testimony giving
specific examples of LPNs who had used the level two coaching process
to suspend or terminate an employee. 1 3 The court explained that
"[t]he frequency with which an employee exercise[d] disciplinary
authority ... cannot be determinative of the existence of supervisory
authority."'
Similarly, the Board failed to consider other employee
testimony indicating that LPNs exercised independent discretion in
disciplining CNAs without involving higher-level supervisors.0 5
In its opinion, the court noted that the applicable standard of review
for NLRB decisions is "exceedingly narrow," requiring the court to be
"bound by the Board's factual findings if they are supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole." 6 Nonetheless, the
court emphasized that it was not "obliged to stand aside and rubberstamp" Board decisions unsupported by the record, as "[t]he Board
cannot ignore the relevant evidence that detracts from its findings."' 7
After reviewing the record at length, the court determined that the
record did not support the Board's conclusion, and the Board had
"misconstrue[d] and disregard[ed] critical evidence concerning the LPNs'
0
role in the disciplinary process for CNAs.""'
In the opinion, the court sharply criticized both the NLRB's reasoning
and its evaluation of the record evidence. 109 For example, in considering the Board's determination that LPNs "merely report misconduct to
their superiors," the court stated that the Board had "again disregard[ed]
compelling and uncontradicted evidence to the contrary."'10 Elsewhere
in the opinion the court characterized the Board's decision as resting
"entirely on speculative inferences" instead of the evidence before it."'

102. Id. at 1337-40.
103. Id. at 1338.
104. Id. (citing Caremore, Inc. v. NLRB, 129 F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir. 1997)).
105. Id. at 1339.
106. Id. at 1335 (quoting Intl Bhd. of Boilermakers v. NLRB, 127 F.3d 1300, 1306 (11th
Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. Id. (quoting Cooper/T. Smith, Inc. v. NLRB, 177 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 1999);
Northport Health Svcs. Inc. v. NLRB, 961 F.2d 1547, 1550 (11th Cir. 1992)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
108. Id. at 1336.
109. Id. at 1337.
110. Id. at 1339.
111. Id. at 1340.
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Indeed, many of the Board's determinations in support of its conclusion
that the LPNs were "employees" were simply dismissed,'12 found
clearly inaccurate,"' or held by the court to be "objectively refute[d]"
by the record. 114
Throughout the opinion, the extent to which the majority disagreed
with the Board's handling of this case was clear. The court explained
that
[iun light of th[e] uncontradicted testimony, the language of Lakeland's
employee handbook, the LPNs' job description, and the level two
coaching forms in the record, the record as a whole does not support by
substantial evidence the Board's conclusion that the LPNs' role in the
level two coaching process is "merely reportorial."" 5
In addition, the court found further evidence for the LPNs' supervisory6
status in looking at their authority to initiate level one coachings,"
as well as to "responsibly direct""' and "assign""8 CNAs in their
work. The court further noted that its determination that the Lakeland
LPNs are "supervisors" is bolstered by decisions from the Sixth" 9 and
Fourth 120 Circuits (reaching the same determination in relation to

112. Id. at 1346. ("The Board disregarded this and other areas of testimony as 'purely
conclusory.' They were not.").
113. Id. at 1342 ("We also cannot accept the Board's rejection of the testimony
establishing that the LPNs exercise independent judgment in issuing level one coachings
solely on the basis that it was 'vague.' Lakeland's evidence on this point was neither
refuted nor vague.").
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1340.
116. Id. at 1341-43.
117. Id. at 1343-46. Regarding the authority to "responsibly direct" CNAs, the court
held that documentary evidence (e.g. job descriptions, company policies, performance
evaluations) and corroborating testimony showing that there wereprospectiveconsequences
for LPNs who did not ensure subordinates did their jobs properly was sufficient evidence.
That is, Lakeland did not have to show specific, actual examples of LPNs suffering adverse
consequences for failures of oversight to prove that they had supervisory duties. Id. at
1344 n.14.
118. Id. at 1347-49. Regarding work assignments, the court noted that LPNs exercised
independent judgment and discretion in assigning CNAs to Resident Nurses based on the
LPNs' individual assessment of a CNA's skills, transferring CNAs between rooms, and
reassigning them tasks, particularly when the LPNs were the highest-ranking employees
on duty during night shifts. Id, at 1349.
119. Extendicare Health Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 182 F. App'x 412, 413 (6th Cir. 2006)
(finding floor nurses at a nursing facility to be "supervisors").
120. Glenmark Assocs. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 333,345 (4th Cir. 1998) (overturning Board
decision that registered nurses and LPNs at employer's nursing homes were not
"supervisors" as inconsistent with the evidence because the employees exercised
independent judgment over staffing and discipline decisions).
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nurses performing similar job functions), though it23was in conflict with
122
decisions from the Second"' and First Circuits.
In a dissent, Judge William Pryor characterized the majority as
"improperly substitut[ing] its own views of the facts for those of the
Board, and fail[ing] to adhere to our deferential standard of review.""
Accusing the majority of the same sort of evidentiary omissions that it
accused the Board of making, Judge Pryor wrote, "the majority opinion
fails to mention significant testimony" supporting the Board's conclusion
that LPNs had no authority to discipline, suspend, or terminate
CNAs.12' He cited testimony from an LPN called to testify by the
Board who "provided unequivocal testimony that the [LPNs] neither
possess nor exercise supervisory authority." 26 From this testimony,
Judge Pryor explained that the Board could have plausibly inferred that
LPNs lacked the authority required to confer supervisor status under the
127
ILRA.
Judge Pryor further weighed much of the other evidence described by
the majority as compelling to be instead, "at best, ambiguous." "
Given that ambiguity, in his view, the Board was entitled to draw its
own plausible conclusions, and the court was required by its narrow
standard of review to enforce the Board's decision. 129 Judge Pryor took
the same position in relation to the Board's findings that LPNs neither
responsibly directed CNAs, nor had the authority to assign them using
independent judgment. 3 ° In sum, Judge Pryor's dissent conveyed his
position that the majority had reweighed the evidence in the case,

121. NLRB v. Saint Mary Home, 358 F. App'x 255, 257-58 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding that

substantial evidence supported an NLRB decision that charge nurses at a nursing facility
did not discipline, responsibly direct, or exercise independent judgment in assigning work

to CNAs).
122. NLRB v. Hilliard Dev. Corp., 187 F.3d 133, 148 (1st Cir. 1999).
123. Lakeland Health Care Assocs., LLC, 696 F.3d at 1340 n.8. In Extendicare, the
court wrote that "the use of independent judgment in writing up employees' infractions is
a supervisory function." 182 F. App'x at 417.
124. Lakeland Health Care Assocs., LLC, 696 F.3d at 1350 (Pryor, J., dissenting)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
125. Id. at 1351.
126. Id. The nurse-one of the most senior nurses at Lakeland-testified that she had
not considered herself a supervisor, that she had never hired, fired, transferred, promoted,
or even disciplined a CRN, and that the only time she issued a level one coaching form was
at the instruction of her superior after discussing the situation with the supervisor first.

Id.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See id.
Id.
Id. at 1352-53.
Id. at 1353-54.
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substituted its own view of the facts for that of the Board,
and exceeded
3
the allowable standard of review for Board decisions.1 1
In recent years, some have argued that the NLRB has taken a
decidedly pro-union turn in its decisions on a variety of issues, and this
case could perhaps be viewed as pushback from the Eleventh Circuit on
an unwarranted narrowing of the definition of "supervisor" under the
NLRA. That is, one may argue that by finding that the LPNs at
Lakeland were not supervisors despite the evidence on record, the Board
was attempting to impermissibly expand the opportunities for unions to
organize LPN "employees" at other assisted living facilities. Given the
strong language of the majority's opinion, the court appears to have
treated the Board's decision as more than merely flawed reasoning or
misinterpretation, characterizing it instead as meticulous exclusion and
disregard for documentary and testimonial evidence in the record.
Although the majority made clear that employers must offer more
than "paper showings" of supervisory status, it was much more willing
than the Board to accept written policies, job descriptions, and performance evaluations corroborated by witness testimony."' Siding with
the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit took a broader view
of the term "supervisor" than that urged by the Board, finding that it
was the potential to exercise supervisory authority that mattered, not
the frequency with which it is done, or even if it is actually done at
all.'33 While cases such as these will always be fact-sensitive, it seems
likely that the Lakeland decision will encourage other employers in the
Eleventh Circuit to challenge the NLRB when they feel its interpretations ignore evidence or reach beyond the limits of the NLRA. Moreover,
the Eleventh Circuit's willingness in Lakeland to challenge NLRB
determinations rather than simply to defer to the Board's judgment may
not be limited to nursing home cases alone. Thus, it is possible that we
will see additional challenges to Board "supervisor" rulings in a range
of other employment settings in the coming year.
IV. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
In 2012 the Eleventh Circuit held that Alabama's Board of Dental
Examiners (the Board) is an arm of the state, entitled to sovereign
immunity and therefore protected from employees' Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) claims."
This holding is noteworthy primarily because

131. Id. at 1354.
132. Id. at 1345 (majority opinion).
133. Id. at 1338.
134. Versigio v. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs of Ala. (Versiglio H), 686 F.3d 1290, 1292-93
(11th Cir. 2012).
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the Eleventh Circuit reached the exact opposite conclusion a year earlier
in the same case, Versiglio v. Board of Dental Examiners of Alabama
(Versiglio I). 35 Reversing course, the court in Versiglio v. Board of
Dental Examiners of Alabama (Versiglio i/)136 relied on a change in
Alabama state law, namely the recent Alabama Supreme Court decision
concluding that the Board was an arm of the state subject to sovereign
Versiglio Ii ultimateimmunity from suits in Alabama state courts.'
ly reinforces the Eleventh Circuit's deference to state court decisions
interpreting matters of state concern in the context of sovereign
immunity.
In Versiglio I, the plaintiff contended that the Board failed to pay her
overtime for time worked in excess of forty hours per week, asserting
that this claim could be brought against the Board because the Board
was not protected by sovereign immunity.'3 8 The court elected to
disregard Eleventh Circuit precedent supporting a finding that sovereign
immunity would protect the Board from such claims, explaining that
such a conclusion would be inconsistent with the Alabama Court of Civil
Appeals' decision in Wilkinson v.Board of Dental Examiners ofAlabama
(Wilkinson ),39 which had found that the Board was not an arm of the
state subject to sovereign immunity. 4 ° Accordingly, in Versiglio I the
court appeared inclined to affirm the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama's decision that the Board is not entitled to
sovereign immunity and is subject to the plaintiff's FLSA claims.'
The court did not, however, issue a mandate of this affirmance, because
the court learned that the Alabama Supreme Court granted the Board's
petition for a writ of certiorari in Wilkinson V42
Nearly one year after deciding Versiglio I, the Eleventh Circuit
reversed the district court's earlier decision and followed the Alabama
Supreme Court's May 25, 2012 decision in Wilkinson v. Board of Dental

135. 651 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2011), vacated by Versiglio H, 686 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir.
2012).
136. 686 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2012).
137. See Wilkinson v. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs of Ala., 102 So. 3d 368 (Ala. 2012).
138. Versiglio v. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs of Ala. (Versiglio 1), 651 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir.
2011), vacated by Versigio II, 686 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2012).
139. 102 So. 3d 362 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011), rev'd, 102 So. 3d 368 (Ala. 2012).
140. Versigio 1, 651 F.3d at 1276-77.
141. Id. at 1277.
142. In Versiglio II the court stated, "once this court became aware of the Alabama
Supreme Court's decision to grant the Board's petition for a writ of certiorari, we withheld
issuance of our mandate that could have resulted in the incongruous result having a 'state
agency' that is immune from suit under state law but not federal law." 686 F.3d at 1292.
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Examiners of Alabama (Wilkinson 1/)143 concluding that the Board is
in fact an arm of the state and immune from lawsuits in state
courts.'"

Before reversing the district court's decision, the court

explained that "Iw]hether an agency qualifies as an arm of the state is
a federal question with a federal standard, but whether that standard
is met will be determined by carefully reviewing how the agency is
defined by state law." 4 ' The Eleventh Circuit then proceeded to look
to Wilkinson 11 in which the Alabama Supreme Court held "that the
Board is 'an arm of the state' rather than a mere 'franchisee licensed for
some beneficial purpose.' . . . Therefore, the Board . . . is entitled to

immunity."14 To avoid the incongruous situation in which the Board
constituted a "state agency" immune from suit under state law, but not
federal law, the Eleventh Circuit decided to follow Wilkinson 11.147 In
deferring to the Alabama Supreme Court's determination in Wilkinson
II, the Eleventh Circuit "[kept] with the ordinary deference granted state
courts when they interpret matters of state concern" and held that the
Board is protected by sovereign immunity against the plaintiff's FLSA
4
claim.

In 2011, we analyzed Versiglio I, noting the significance of the
Eleventh Circuit's decision to ignore its own precedent in Miccosukee
Tribe of Indians v. Florida State Athletic Commission,49 where the
court set out the factors analyzed to determine whether an entity like
50
the Board is an arm of the state entitled to sovereign immunity.
The court made no mention of Miccosukee in Versiglio 11 and instead
based the entire decision on the Alabama Supreme Court's ruling in
Wilkinson II. 1"1 Accordingly, Versiglio 11 once again emphasizes and
reinforces the Eleventh Circuit's deference to the manner in which state
courts classify state entities for purposes of determining sovereign
immunity protection. For parties seeking to assert or defend claims
brought against state entities, Versiglio II suggests that the Eleventh
Circuit will follow the state court's determination about whether an
entity is entitled to sovereign immunity. In future cases, it will be
interesting to observe how the Eleventh Circuit decides the sovereign

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

102 So. 3d 386 (Ala. 2012).
Versiglio II, 686 F.3d at 1292-93.
Id. at 1291.
Id. at 1292 (quoting Wilkinson, 102 So. 3d at 386).
Id.
Id. at 1292-93.
226 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1231.
Versiglio H, 686 F.3d at 1292-93.
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immunity issue when no state court has already made a determination
about whether a specific state agency is entitled to sovereign immunity.
V.

GEORGIA RESTRICTIVE COVENANT LAW

In an unpublished opinion that was nonetheless of unique importance
for Georgia restrictive covenant laws, the Eleventh Circuit in Becham v.
Synthes USA 5 ' held that the original Georgia covenant statute, House
Bill 173 (HB 173), 153 was unconstitutional and void."' As a result,
only covenants executed on or after May 11, 2011 (the date a subsequent
covenant statute, House Bill 30 (HB 30), 155 was enacted) will fall under
the new, more permissive statutory covenant law. 156 For all covenants
executed7 prior to that date, Georgia's strict common law rules will
15

apply.

Historically, Georgia common law disfavored restrictive covenants,
158
particularly those entered into as part of an employment agreement.
Such covenants received "strict scrutiny" from the courts and could not
be edited or reformed by a court to omit an offending provision and
preserve otherwise enforceable clauses in the agreement (also known as
"blue penciling").' 59 In fact, until very recently "Georgia's constitution
:. . forbade the state's legislature, the General Assembly, from authorizing restrictive covenants" at all. 6 '
However, in November 2010,
Georgia citizens approved a constitutional amendment granting the

152. 482 F. App'x 387 (11th Cir. 2012).
153. Ga. H.R. Bill 173, Reg. Sess. (2009).
154. Becham, 482 F. App'x at 392.
155. Ga. H.R. Bill 30, Reg. Sess. (2011).
156. Becham, 482 F. App'x at 389.
157. Id.
158. Habif, Arogeti & Wynne, P.C. v. Baggett, 231 Ga. App. 289, 289-90, 498 S.E.2d
346, 349 (1998), superseded by statue, O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53 (Supp. 2012), as recognized in
Murphree v. Yancey Bros. Co., 311 Ga. App. 744, 747, 716 S.E.2d 824, 827 (2011) (noting
that Georgia law makes a distinction between covenants entered into as part of an
employment agreement and those ancillary to the sale of a business, with the former
receiving a stricter level of scrutiny).
159. MacGinnitie v. Hobbs Grp., LLC, 420 F.3d 1234, 1241 (11th Cir. 2005); see also
Richard P. Rita Pers. Servs. Int'l, Inc. v. Kot, 229 Ga. 314, 315-17, 191 S.E.2d 79, 80-81
(1972) (refusing for the first time to apply the blue-pencil rule of severability to reform a
restrictive covenant to make it enforceable); Kuehn v. Selton & Assocs., Inc., 242 Ga. App.
662, 664, 530 S.E.2d 787, 789 (2000) ("If any clause within a restrictive covenant is
unenforceable, the entire covenant must fail; we will not apply the blue pencil theory of
severability to restrictive covenants in employment contracts.").
160. Becham, 482 F. App'x at 388; see also Jackson & Coker, Inc. v. Hart, 261 Ga. 371,
372, 405 S.E.2d 253, 254-55 (1991) (holding an act giving Georgia courts the power to
partially enforce restrictive covenants to be void as beyond the power of the General
Assembly and expressly prohibited by the state constitution).
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General Assembly the power "to authorize and provide by general law
for judicial enforcement of contracts or agreements restricting ...
[certain] competitive activit[y]. " 161

Unfortunately, for unknown reasons, the new amendment contained
no effective date.'62 Nonetheless, prior to the amendment being
approved by the voters, the General Assembly enacted HB 173, which
purported to authorize previously unlawful agreements by, among other
things, permitting courts to reform overly broad restrictive covenants. 16 3 Because the General Assembly lacked the authority to pass
HB 173 to be effective immediately, the General Assembly set the
effective date for the day after Georgia's voters ratified the constitutional
amendment permitting such a law."' When that ratification occurred,
however, the amendment's own lack of an effective date began to
complicate matters significantly. The court summarized:
On November 2, 2010, Georgia's citizens approved the constitutional
amendment. But, because the amendment lacked an effective date, it
did not immediately go into effect. Instead, pursuant to the Georgia
constitution, the amendment became effective on January 1, 2011. HB
173, on the other hand, went into effect the next day-November 3,
2010.16

Recognizing that there was now a two-month gap between the effective
date of the new restrictive covenant statute and the effective date of the
constitutional amendment making that statute lawful, the General
Assembly passed a new bill-HB 30-which "repealed HB 173 and then
66
substantially reenacted its provisions with only a few changes."
This bill became effective on the day that the governor signed it-May
11, 2011-and by its terms applied to contracts entered into on or after
that date but not before. 167 Such was the state of Georgia's law on
restrictive covenants when it came before the Eleventh Circuit in mid2012.
The facts underlying Becham are not particularly important to the
holding on Georgia's covenant laws, with the exception of the date the
covenants at issue were entered. To summarize briefly, when William
Becham left his employer, Synthes USA, he allegedly promised to honor

161. Becham, 482 F. App'x at 388 (first alteration in original).
162. Id.

163. Id.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 389.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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certain restrictive covenants16 in exchange for a large severance
payment. The agreement was allegedly entered into on December 1,
2010-after HB 173 had purportedly taken effect but before the
constitution had been officially amended to allow it. Moreover, Becham
allegedly agreed to the covenants a second time in January 2011-after
the constitutional amendment was in effect but before the repeal and
reenactment of HB 173 as HB' 30. After receiving his payment in
January 2011, however, Becham filed suit seeking a declaratory
judgment that the covenants were unenforceable and then promptly
began working for one of Synthes's competitors. The United States
District Court for the Middle District of Georgia granted summary
judgment to Becham in September 2011, finding that Georgia law
governed and the covenants were unenforceable.
On appeal, Synthes made several arguments that turned on the status
of Georgia's public policy toward restrictive covenants when the
agreement was made. First, due to a choice of law provision in Becham's
employment contract calling for the application of Pennsylvania law,
Synthes argued that the district court had erred in finding that Georgia
law applied.6 9 The district court determined that the covenants would
have likely been enforceable under Pennsylvania law, and Georgia courts
"will not enforce a choice-of-law provision when the application of foreign
law would violate Georgia's public policy."7 ' Because the district court
determined that enforcement of the covenants would be repugnant to
Georgia public policy, it refused to apply Pennsylvania law. Thus, the
court on appeal had to decide if the enforcement of the contracts would
indeed offend Georgia public policy as it stood in December 2010.
Second, Synthes argued that the district court improperly resolved an
issue of material fact in Becham's favor by finding that the agreement
was not renewed in January 2011, after the constitution was amended
to allow the General Assembly to enact a law like HB 177.1" But even
if the agreement was not revived in January 2011, and thus fell under
Georgia's public policy as of December 2010, Synthes maintained that
"Georgia's public policy shifted in November 2010 to support the broad

168.

There were four restrictive covenants at issue: (1) a noncompete agreement; (2)

a nonsolicitation-of-customers agreement; (3) a nonsolicitation-of-employees covenant; and
(4) a nondisclosure agreement. Id.

169. Id. at 390-91.
170. Id. at 391 (citing Nasco, Inc. v. Gimbert, 239 Ga. 675, 676, 238 S.E.2d 368, 369
(1977)).

171. Id. at 392.
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17 when
enforcement of restrictive covenants,"
the voters approved the
17 3

constitutional amendment.

174
The Eleventh Circuit did not agree with Synthes's agreement.
The court observed that the amendment only enabled the legislature to
pass laws regarding restrictive covenants; it did not actually enact such
a law.'75 "Because the amendment addressed only the power of the
General Assembly, it did not affect Georgia's public policy on restrictive
covenants."' 76 By contrast, HB 173 did change Georgia's public policy
177
by enabling courts to enforce previously unlawful agreements.
Although the district court held that HB 173 had become effective along
with the amendment on January 1, 2011, the Eleventh Circuit instead
held that, by its terms, the bill became effective the day after the
amendment was ratified-November 3, 2010.178 Therefore, Becham's
alleged agreement of December 1, 2010, would have fallen under HB 173
and been "at least partially enforceable" had179the court not also decided
that HB 173 was unconstitutional and void.
In Georgia, the court explained, "a statute's constitutionality is tested
at the time it was passed." 8 0 When HB 173 was passed, by its terms,
it went into effect on November 3, 2010, the day after the voters ratified
the constitutional amendment. 8 ' On that date, however, "Georgia's
constitution prohibited the General Assembly from enacting any

legislation authorizing the enforcement of restrictive covenants .... As

such, HB 173 was unconstitutional and void the moment it went into
effect." 8 2 Moreover, the court held that HB 173 was not automatically
"revived" when the constitutional amendment took effect in January
2011.183 Rather, the changes to the law (and to Georgia's public policy)
regarding restrictive covenants only became valid when the General
Assembly substantially reenacted the original bill as HB 30, which took
effect on May 11, 2011.184

Finally, because HB 30 did not apply

retroactively, neither the alleged December 2010 agreement nor the
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alleged January 2011 renewal of that agreement were covered by the
new laws."
Accordingly, the court held that the "old" Georgia
common law applied, under which the court found each of the restrictive
covenants at issue to be "unreasonable as a matter of law and, therefore,
void and unenforceable." 8 6
While it is always possible that the Georgia Supreme Court or a
different Eleventh Circuit panel could reach a different result in the
future, unless and until that happens it is likely that federal district and
state trial court judges will follow Becham on this issue even though it
is an unpublished, and therefore non-binding, Eleventh Circuit opinion.
In light of this decision, Georgia employers who drafted new covenant
agreements in reliance on HB 173 and had their employees sign them
before May 11, 2011, should revisit those agreements. Although its
impact is relatively narrow, this case is, at the very least, an interesting
example of the unintended consequences of an important omission in
legislative drafting.
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